Leveraged ETFs have received much press coverage of late due to issues with their performance. Managers and the media have focused investors' attention on the impact of compounding, when the funds are held for more than one day. In this paper, I propose a simple way to disentangle the effect of compounding and that of i) the management of the fund and ii) the trading premiums/discounts, all of which affect investors' returns. The former (i) is influenced by the effectiveness of the manager's replication strategy and the cost of leverage. The latter (ii) reflects liquidity and the efficiency of the market. I find that tracking errors were not caused by the effects of compounding alone. Depending on the fund, the impact of management factors can outweigh the impact of compounding, and substantial premiums/discounts caused by reduced liquidity during the financial crisis further distorted performance.
I. Introduction
In the last few years, the market for Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) has grown exponentially; there were more than 1200 ETFs listed in the U.S. and Canada in the spring of 2010. In this paper, my focus is on a relatively new type of ETFs: Leveraged ETFs. There are two main varieties of leveraged ETFs, those that magnify an index's return (ultra or bull ETFs), and those that track or magnify its inverse (bear ETFs). Approximately 13 percent of the ETFs traded in the U.S. are of the leveraged variety, and they account for 26 percent of the ETF trading volume. In Canada, the comparable numbers are 26 percent and a striking 61 percent, respectively.
1 These numbers continue to grow, and is testimony to the popularity of these funds, considering the first leveraged ETF was introduced in June 2006. However, exactly because they are relatively new investment vehicles, little academic research has focused on the performance of these funds.
The management of leveraged ETFs differ significantly from that of regular ETFs. For regular ETFs, which tracks an index or a portfolio, 2 an arbitrage mechanism exists through out the trading day to keep the price of an ETF in sync with the price of its underlying index. This mechanism is a process called in-kind redemption and creation. When an ETF is trading at a premium, authorized participants 3 can swap the underlying basket of securities for shares of the ETF (and hence new shares are created). When the ETF is trading at a discount, authorized participants can redeem their shares in return for the underlying basket of securities. Hence, unlike a closed-end mutual fund, the ETF's number of shares outstanding is always changing. That said, depending on the extent of the arbitrage activities and the liquidity of the market, ETFs can still trade at a premium or a discount. 4 The underlying index may be stale, however, if it is made up of securities that are traded overseas.
Leveraged ETFs operate very differently. These funds aim to track daily returns, instead of the price of an underlying index at a higher frequency (e.g., 15-minute intervals). Leverage and derivative securities such as total return swaps and future contracts are employed by the leveraged ETF manager (or a third-party structured product specialist) to magnify the underlying index's return or its inverse by two or three times. The portfolio is rebalanced once a day toward at the end of the trading day. The leveraged ETF's end-of-day net asset value (NAV) is made known to authorized participants, and so an arbitrage mechanismalbeit in cash rather than in kind -also exists to help keep the market price of the leveraged ETF close to its NAV, at least at the end of the trading day.
Investors are attracted to these ETFs, because these ETFs allow them to increase their market exposure or to hedge without a margin account, and without any expertise in leveraging or derivative securities. In the case of inverse leveraged ETFs, losses are limited to the value of the transaction, unlike regular short positions. In addition, they may serve as a substitute for short-selling when the underlying assets are difficult and expensive to borrow (Avellaneda (2010) ).
Recently, the performance of leveraged ETFs has been called into question. Class action law suits are in the works, 5 and the SEC, FINRA and its Canadian counterpart, IIROC, have all issued investor alerts. Financial advisors have grown leery about recommending them because of the complexity of the products. 6 For example, in a recent CFA Magazine article, Sullivan (2009) advises that, "Prudent investors .... should consider the use of leveraged funds with great caution, especially for periods longer than a day." Direxion Funds, which manages a number of leveraged ETFs, also says on its website that their products are for "sophisticated deviations from net asset value are calculated with stale prices. 5 According to Globe NewsWire on November 25, 2009, a law firm in the U.S. is investigating claims in several ProShares leveraged ETFs, that ProShares' registration statement, prospectuses, and statements of additional information were false and misleading, and did not provide adequate disclosure. 6 In fact, in the U.S., certain brokerage firms such as Morgan Stanley and UBS have banned their advisors from recommending leveraged ETFs.
investors who understand ... (the) consequences of seeking daily leveraged investment results and intend to actively monitor and manage their investments ...". Similar disclaimers can be found on the website of virtually all leveraged ETF management companies.
Specifically, investors are being warned about the impact of compounding on returns, when a fund is held for more than one day. The reason given is that these funds have a daily return target; therefore, the compounded return of a leveraged ETF over a longer holding period "will likely differ in amount and possibly direction from the target return for the same period." 7 These statements are disconcerting for investors: Most of them have horizons that are longer than a day (except for day traders), and it is simply impractical and expensive for them to rebalance their portfolios on a daily basis.
In this paper, the performance of a leveraged ETF is defined in terms of its average deviations from its target return, as well as the volatility of the deviations, known as "tracking error" in the investment literature. To the leveraged ETF investor, there are three components to the fund's performance: The impact of compounding if the holding period is longer than one day, the effectiveness and the costs of the fund's management in achieving its investment objective, and the efficiency of the leveraged ETF market in maintaining a small trading premium/discount. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the performance of a select group of domestic and foreign equity leveraged ETFs, from an investor's perspective.
The underlying indices are: S&P/TSX60, S&P500, S&P/TSX Global Gold, DJ/Oil and Gas, 8 MSCI Europe, Australia, and Far East (EAFE), and MSCI Emerging Markets (EM).
The main contribution of this paper is the decomposition of the deviations into three buckets: 1) deviations due to compounding, 2) deviations due to the manager's ability to consistently achieve the target return, and 3) deviations due to the ETF being traded at a premium/discount to its net asset value (NAV). The impact of compounding has been raised in several studies (Avellaneda and Zhang (2009) , Cheng and Madhaven (2009), Lu, 7 http://www.proshares.com. I will elaborate on the impact of compounding further in the next section. 8 The S&P/TSX Global Gold index is not based directly on the price of gold bullion, but rather, it is made up of 49 companies in the gold mining business. Similarly, the DJ/Oil and Gas index is made up of 94 companies in the oil and gas industry. Wang, and Zhang (2009), and Hill and Foster (2009) ). Leveraged ETF managers and the media have also focused investors' attention on the impact of compounding, especially when the funds are performing poorly. The missing piece of the puzzle is whether the other two factors contribute to that performance and by how much, as well as to what extent they are affected by the financial crisis of 2008. Hence, it is informative to disentangle the effects of compounding, fund management, and trading premiums/discounts. Fund management includes expenses and factors that may prevent the manager from achieving the target return consistently, including tighter credit conditions, counterparty risk, currency risk, and so on. However, the returns are influenced by three different factors -compounding, management, and trading premium/discount, as discussed above. Hence, the next step in the analysis is to decompose the deviations of each leveraged ETF from its target return into the three different types of deviations, and highlight their relative importance. Since the financial crisis in the fall of 2008 occurred in the middle of my sample period, I am also able to assess its impact on the performance of the leveraged ETFs. Last but not least, I study the impact of the financial crisis on the market microstructure of the leveraged ETFs, focusing on the intraday share price volatility, trading volume, and bid-ask spread. The latter, of course, is a widely used measure of market liquidity, which may influence trading premiums/ discounts, particularly during the crisis period. I also examine whether the intraday trading patterns of leveraged ETFs differ from that of regular stocks.
To preview my results, I show that bear ETFs deviate from their target return much more quickly than their bull counterparts as the holding period lengthens. Contrary to popular belief though, returns to leveraged ETFs can deviate from their target even if investors rebalance on a daily basis. For example, in the case of the EAFE and EM bear ETFs, their respective underlying indices explain only 36 to 40 percent of the variations in their daily returns, possibly due to the problem of nonsynchronous trading between the ETF and its underlying index. In terms of the alphas, they are mostly negative, and they typically become statistically significant starting at the 1-week holding period. They can also be alarmingly large, particularly when the ETFs are held for a year. When I decompose the deviations of a leveraged ETF from its target return, I find -perhaps not surprisingly -that mean deviations due to compounding were the biggest in 2008. Tracking errors due to management factors and trading premium/discount also experienced a substantial increase during the financial crisis. For the EAFE, EM, and S&P500 bear ETFs, management factors had a much greater impact on their performance than compounding across all holding periods examined. Part of the reason, at least for the S&P500 bear ETF, is the one-time large capital gain distribution made by the fund at the end of 2008. Interestingly, for the full sample period, the deviations due to compounding have overall a low or negative correlation with the deviations due to management factors. Hence, the two types of deviations appear to be driven by different forces, and do not reinforce each other in dragging down or pulling up the returns of the leveraged ETFs. The only exceptions were the S&P500 bull and bear ETFs, where the correlations increased to significant levels as the holding period lengthened, but this was observed only in specific years, namely 2006 and 2007. In terms of the deviations due to trading premiums/discounts, there was a noticeable jump during the financial crisis, suggesting a temporary loss of market efficiency and liquidity over that period. Last but not least, I find that the financial crisis had an asymmetric impact on the bull versus the bear ETFs' intraday trading patterns. It had a much bigger effect on the intraday share price volatility of the bear ETFs than the bull ETFs, even though the latter experienced a much greater surge in trading volume during the crisis. In terms of the intraday average bid-ask spreads, the results show that most of the leveraged ETFs suffered a significant reduction in liquidity during the financial crisis, explaining the jump in trading premiums/discounts during that period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, I provide a background discussion on the impact of compounding, and describe the data employed in the empirical exercises. In section III, I estimate the alphas and betas of a set of domestic and international equity leveraged ETFs over different holding periods. In section IV, I decompose their tracking errors into deviations due to compounding, deviations due to management factors, and deviations due to trading premiums/discounts. Additionally, I study how these deviations behave over time. In section V, I examine the market microstructure of the leveraged ETFs, followed by a discussion of how it was affected by the financial crisis. In particular, I look at whether the premiums/discounts documented in section IV coincided with a reduction in liquidity. A summary section concludes the paper.
II. Background and data
In this paper, I refer to all leveraged ETFs that are designed to produce twice the return of the underlying index as "2x bulls", and those designed to produce twice the inverse of the return as "2x bears". Recently, leveraged ETFs that seek to produce three times the return or the inverse of the return of an underlying index have been introduced, but due to their even shorter history, the funds that I examine in this paper are all of the 2x variety.
Because of growing investor concerns and complaints about the performance of leveraged ETFs, companies that manage these funds are now very careful to specify that leveraged ETFs seeks to replicate twice the return (or the inverse of the return) of an index for a single day only. Additionally, "due to the compounding of daily returns, ProShares' returns over periods other than one day will likely differ in amount and possibly direction from the target return for the same period." (ProShares website) 9 The impact of compounding on cumulative 9 http://www.proshares.com/funds/.
returns is a fact that cannot be changed. It is easy to demonstrate that over a 2-day holding period, the net return on the underlying index is:
(1 + r t )(1 + r t+1 ) − 1 = r t + r t+1 + r t r t+1
And the net return on a 2x bull ETF is:
(1 + 2r t )(1 + 2r t+1 ) − 1 = 2(r t + r t+1 + r t r t+1 ) + 2r t r t+1
Assuming that the ×2 replication is perfect on a daily basis, the deviation due to compounding, (2) -2×(1), is 2r t r t+1 . Note that the effect of compounding is not symmetric:
For a 2x bear leveraged ETF, the net return over a 2-day holding period is:
Assuming perfect replication again, the deviation due to compounding is 6r t r t+1 for the 2x bear ETF, which is three times bigger than the deviation of its 2x bull counterpart. If there is momentum (positive or negative) in daily returns (i.e., trending up or down), the deviations will be positive. In other words, if the underlying index is trending up, a 2x bull ETF will generate a higher return than otherwise, and a 2x bear ETF will generate a smaller loss than otherwise. I will call this the "trending" effect. If returns are negatively autocorrelated (i.e., a positive return on day t followed by a negative return on day t + 1, or vice versa), the deviations will be negative. Therefore, even if the underlying index breaks even, both the 2x bull and 2x bear ETFs will post a negative return, with the latter being three times larger. I will call this the "flat-return" effect.
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Any residual deviations in the actual leveraged ETF market returns are likely due to the management process and to the existence of trading premiums/discounts. First of all, the leveraged ETF manager may not be able to consistently replicate the target return perfectly, which can be caused by tighter credit conditions, counterparty risk, currency risk, and so on.
Fees and expenses will also be a factor (thus creating a drag on returns), but they are low on a daily basis, and more importantly, they should not produce any significant time-series variations, as they are distributed evenly throughout the year (so that short-term investors pay their share as well). Second, a temporary loss in market efficiency (for example, during a period of financial turmoil and reduced liquidity) may cause the market price of a leveraged ETF to deviate from its NAV, to which the portfolio is rebalanced on a daily basis.
The market data used in this paper are from 
III. Overview: Alphas and Betas
It is instructive to start the analysis by providing an overview of the performance of the funds. I do so by estimating the alpha and beta of each fund over different holding periods.
Again, "performance" is defined in terms of the fund's ability to consistently achieve its target return. The set of leveraged ETFs I study are based on the following equity indices:
Canadian blue chips (S&P/TSX60), gold (S&P/TSX Global Gold index) 12 , oil and gas (DJ/ Oil and Gas index), international and emerging market equities (MSCI EAFE index and MSCI EM index), and U.S. blue chips (S&P500 In the regression analysis below, the ETF returns are calculated using market prices.
In other words, the analysis are conducted from an investor's perspective: Although the ETF manager rebalances the portfolio with respect to the NAV of the fund, investors receive returns based on market prices, i.e, including any premium or discount at which the fund is trading. In Section IV where I assess the contribution of the management of the fund to the tracking error, returns of the ETFs will be calculated using NAVs, and the difference between the NAV and the market price is the trading premium/discount. is actually the most leptokurtic of the three, because it has more tail observations (e.g., those that are more than one standard deviation away from the mean), and likely to have a narrower, single peak in the distribution.
[ Table 1] I report the regression results in Panel B. The adjusted R 2 s are all reasonably high.
The null hypothesis for the alpha estimates 13 is H 0 = 0, and the null hypothesis for the beta estimates is H 0 = 2 for the 2x bull ETFs, and H 2 = −2 for the 2x bear ETFs. It is interesting that for HXU, the 1-month and 3-month holding period betas are closest to 2 (they are 1.9835 and 1.9590, respectively), and the null cannot be rejected for these two estimates. For HXD, it is the 1-week and 1-month holding period beta estimates where the null cannot be rejected. The deviation is the largest over a 1-year holding period, where the estimated coefficient for beta is -1.3323. So it is interesting -at least for the sample period in question, that the best replication results -from an investor's perspective -are not found in the 1-day holding period returns, as argued by leveraged ETF management companies.
Comparing only the beta estimates, however, does not tell the whole story. Some of the alphas are quite significant both statistically and economically. These alphas are estimates of the leveraged ETFs' returns when their underlying index has a return of zero during the holding period, i.e., they are part of the return that is unrelated to the underlying index.
For HXD, for example, even if the S&P/TSX60 had a zero percent return, investors would still have lost 24.03 percent for the year.
In Tables 2 to 5, I provide the results for the other leveraged ETFs based on the S&P/TSX Global Gold, DJ/US Oil and Gas, MSCI Emerging Markets, MSCI EAFE, and S&P500.
For the 2x bull Gold ETF (ticker: HGU), beta increases initially with the holding period, peaking at 1-month (Table 2 ). Except for the 1-month and the 1-year holding periods, the null hypothesis of H 0 = 2 can be rejected. For the 2x bear Gold ETF (ticker: HGD), the null hypothesis of H 0 = −2 is rejected for all of the holding periods. Of note is the performance of HGD at the 1-year horizon: During the sample period in question, it has a very small beta estimate of -0.0959, and an alpha estimate of -0.8347. That is, if the global gold index had a zero percent return, investors would still suffer a loss of 83.47 percent for the year! Given these estimates, the gold index would have to drop by 870% within the year just for investors to break-even. 14 Contrast this to the 1-week holding period for HGD, where the global gold index only has to lose 0.28 percent over five days (15.79 percent annualized) for investors to break even.
[ Table 2 ]
The results for the 2x bull and 2x bear Oil and Gas ETF, (Tickers: DIG and DUG, respectively) are reported in Table 3 . For DIG, the null hypthesis of H 0 = 2 cannot be rejected for the 1-week, 1-month, and 3-month holding periods. For DUG, the null of H 0 = −2 cannot be rejected for the 2-day and 1-week holding periods. The largest deviation in beta can be found in DUG when it is held for a year: The beta estimate is -0.7911, which is significantly bigger than -2. The alphas can again be sizeable. Holding DUG for 1-year can result in a loss of 49.97 percent even if the DJ/Oil and Gas index has a zero percent return.
Put another way, even if investors bet in the right direction, it takes a 63.17 percent drop in the index for them to break even.
[ Table 3 ]
Next, I discuss the regression results for the 2x Bear ETF for the MSCI EAFE index and the MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) index (Tickers: EFU and EEV, respectively), in Table   4 . Interestingly, the 2x bear ETFs for these indices were introduced in the fall of 2007, but the companion 2x bull ETFs were introduced much later, in June 2009. Due to the lack of observations, I do not include the 2x bull MSCI ETFs. As shown in Table 4 , for both 2x
Bears, EFU and EEV, the results are again poor for certain holding periods. To summarize,
there is a substantial drop in R 2 across the board in these regressions compared to the other leveraged ETFs. The alphas (especially for EEV) are large and statistically significant once the holding period is 1-week or longer, and the beta for the 1-day EFU deviates significantly from 2, and the R 2 for the regression is only 0.3628, indicating that only 36.28 percent of the variations in the daily EFU returns can be explained by the variations in the MSCI EAFE returns, the lowest across all holding periods. A possible reason for this result is the nonsynchronicity in the trading of the ETF and its underling index. While the ETF is being traded in New York, the Asian markets are already closed, and the European markets close half way through. Hence, additional information might have been impounded into the price of the ETF. 15 Finally, for investors to break even over a one-year horizon, the EAFE index needs to fall by 20.54 percent, and the EM index, 205.74 percent during the sample period in question.
[ Table 4 ] Table 5 contains the results for the S&P500 2x bull and bear (Tickers: SSO and SDS, respectively). As shown in Panel A, the daily returns of SSO and SDS are about twice as 15 For a recent analysis of the impact of nonsynchronous trading in international ETFs, see Shum (2010).
volatile as their underling index, and equally leptokurtic. In Panel B, for SSO, the beta estimates are closest to their target of 2 for the 1-month and 3-month holding periods, while for SDS, they are closest to their target of -2 for the 1-week and 1-month horizon. Of all the 2x bear ETFs in the sample, SDS's beta estimate is the closest to -2 at the 1-year horizon:
it is -1.6275, compared with, for stance, EEV's -0.3238. SDS's alpha estimate is also the smallest at the 1-year horizon, although it is still statistically and economically significant, at -22.46 percent.
IV. Decomposing the deviations from target return

IV.A. Decomposition
From the previous section, we saw that even for a 1-day holding period (i.e., rebalancing daily and has no compounding effect), the betas calculated using market prices can differ significantly from 2 (or -2). Daily deviations from target return would have to come from factors related to the management of the leveraged ETFs and/or trading premiums/discounts.
These factors include liquidity, the efficiency of the derivative and the ETF markets, cost of leverage, and are unlikely to be caused by fees alone. Unless these daily deviations are random and cancel each other out over time, they would also affect returns over holding periods longer than one day. In this section, I decompose the deviations of the leveraged ETFs from their target return to examine the relative importance of the effect of compounding and the effect of management factors for different holding periods. A related question is whether these two types of deviations are correlated. For example, if they are driven by different forces and have zero correlation, then holding the ETF for a longer period will not be as damaging to the performance as if they were positively correlated. Additionally, I show the daily trading premiums/discounts of each fund, and how they vary over time.
To illustrate how the decomposition is done, consider again a holding period of 2 days.
Using equation (2), for a 2x bull ETF, the deviation on day t due to compouding, D CP t , can be written as:
where r t is the underlying index return.
The deviations due to management factors, D M t , is therefore the residual difference:
where R Bull NAV,t is the return of the 2x bull ETF's NAV. I use the NAV here instead of the market price, because the ETF manager rebalances his portfolio to the fund's NAV, not to the market price. Note that the standard deviation of
, is the tracking error due to compounding; similarly, the standard deviation of
, is the tracking error due to management.
Given equations (4) and (5), the net return of holding the 2x bull ETF for 2 days, absent any trading premium/discount, is:
For 2x bear ETFs, "2" (i.e., twice the return) in (4) to (6) would be replaced by "-2".
The same methodology is extended and applied to the longer holding periods in the analysis that follows.
The premium, P t , that the ETF (bull or bear) may be trading at the end of day t is:
where ET F t is the end-of-day market price and NAV t is the end-of-day NAV of the leveraged ETF on day t. While some commodities may have an earlier close during the trading day, all of the eight leveraged ETFs in this study are equity-based, so non-synchronous close (between the ETF and the NAV) is not an issue here in the calculation of P t . If the difference in (7) is negative, then the leveraged ETF is trading at a discount on day t.
IV.B. Tracking Errors
I summarize the compounding and management tracking errors, which are the stan- . These capital gains distributions were so large that they created significant tracking errors in the model. Next, I will turn to the magnitude of the daily deviations, and their cumulative effect over longer horizons.
[ Table 6 ]
IV.C. Mean Deviations
In Panels A and B of Tables 7 to 11 , I present the mean returns and the mean decomposed deviations, D CPt and D Mt , of the 10 leveraged ETFs, for different holding periods.
Because we are dealing with daily observations, the mean returns and the deviations are small. Hence, to put the deviations into context, I report the mean deviation as a percent- In terms of the ETF-specific results, I begin the discussion with HXU and HXD, in Table 7 . Several observations can be made. First, for both of these S&P/TSX60 leveraged ETFs, the mean deviations due to compounding are negative, across holding periods and calendar years. 16 The mean deviations due to management factors, however, can be positive [ Table 7] The results for the gold leveraged ETFs, HGU and HGD, are reported in Table 8 [ Table 8 ]
In Table 9 , I show the results for the oil and gas leveraged ETFs, DIG and DUG. There are three noteworthy observations. First, compounding had a large (and negative) impact in 2008 for DUG, the 2x bear ETF. However, for the 2x bull ETF, DIG, the impact in 2008 was much smaller. This is another example of the asymmetric effect of volatility on bull versus bear ETF returns. Second, interestingly, for DUG, the mean deviations due to management factors, D Mt , were positive across the board. Third, for DIG, D CPt and D Mt , for the entire sample period, 2007 to 2009, are comparable in magnitude, and both were negative.
[ Table 9 ] Next, I turn to the two MSCI 2x bear ETFs in [ Table 10 ]
Last but not last, I report the results for the S&P500 leveraged ETFs, SSO and SDS in Table 11 . Like EFU and EEV above, [ Table 11 ]
IV.D. Time-series variations in deviations not due to compouding
As noted in the introduction, prior research has focused mainly on the properties of compounding; for example, the effect of volatility on a leveraged ETF's returns over different holding periods. In this subsection, I examine the properties of the residual deviations that
are not due to compounding, using returns based on market prices, i.e., the returns that are relevant to investors. Rearranging (6) and replacing the returns based on NAV, R Bull NAV,t , by the returns based on market prices, R Bull Mkt,t , we have the following expression of the deviation not due to compounding, D NCPt , for a bull ETF over a 2-day holding period:
Again, for a bear ETF, the "2" in the above equation would be replaced by "-2". The goal of this paper was to study the performance of a sample of equity leveraged ETFs, and in particular, to disentangle the different components of a fund's returns, from an investor's perspective. A secondary objective was to examine the impact of the recent financial crisis on the performance and the market microstructure of these funds.
To recap, a leveraged ETF is designed to replicate twice (or thrice) the daily return of its underlying index. If the fund is held for more than one day, then its compounded return will deviate from that of the underlying index, creating tracking errors. However, deviations from target return can also be caused by management factors, including the manager's ability to deliver the promised returns, expenses, margin costs, counterparty risk (e.g., in the case of swap contracts), currency risk (in the case of foreign indices), and so on. In addition, deviations can also result from trading premiums/discounts. There is a tendency for leveraged ETF managers and the media to blame poor performance on the effects of compounding, and the other two types of deviations have received little attention. In this paper, I attempted to shed light on this issue. I decompose the returns of a leveraged ETF to investors into these three "buckets", and study the relative importance of each, focusing on the periods before, during, and after the financial crisis. Further, I explored whether the financial crisis affected the intraday trading patterns of the leveraged ETFs.
To summarize the results, I found empirical support that bear ETFs deviate from their target return much more quickly than their bull counterparts as the holding period lengthens. That said, the impact of nonsynchronicity seems to average out over a week (five trading days), as the explanatory power improves to 70 percent. In terms of the alphas, which represent the return accrued to investors if the underlying index had a zero percent return, they are all negative, and they typically become statistically significantly different from zero starting at the 1-week holding period. Some alphas can be alarmingly large, particularly when the funds are held for a year.
Contrary to popular belief though, returns to leveraged
When I decompose the deviations of the leveraged ETFs from their target return, I
found that the tracking error due to management factors can be greater than that due to compounding for certain ETFs. In addition, the mean deviations due to compounding and to management factors in a given year can be positive or negative. In terms of the timeseries relationship between the two types of deviations, the correlation coefficients tend to be small or negative overall, suggesting that the two are likely driven by different forces, and do not reinforce each other in dragging down or pulling up the returns of the leveraged ETFs. For most of the funds in the study, the mean deviations due to compounding were the biggest in 2008, the year of the financial crisis. There was a noticeable jump in trading premiums/discounts during the financial crisis, both in terms of magnitude and volatility, likely due to a temporary loss of liquidity and market efficiency over that period. Last but not least, I find that the financial crisis had an asymmetric impact on the bull versus the bear ETFs' intraday trading patterns. It had a much bigger effect on the intraday share price volatility of the bear ETFs than the bull ETFs, even though the latter experienced a much greater surge in trading volume during the crisis. In terms of the intraday average bid-ask spreads, the results show that most of the leveraged ETFs suffered a significant reduction in liquidity during the financial crisis, explaining the jump in trading premiums/discounts in that period.
In conclusion, because of the unprecedented volatility and the drying up of liquidity in the fall of 2008, the performance of some of the leveraged ETFs studied in this paper was severely impacted. Going forward and barring another major financial crisis, the deviations from target return (for different holding periods) shown in this paper may represent the upperbound. And the trading premiums/discounts, which were shown to be highly volatile during the financial crisis, should return to normalcy. Table 7 Mean Deviations from Target Return Based on NAVs S&P/TSX60, HXU (2x Bull), and HXD (2x Bear) January 9, 2007 -December 31, 2009
Panel A: Mean NAV return of HXU, mean deviation due to compounding as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return, and mean deviation due to the management process (including fees, the manager's ability to meet the investment objective) as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return. Panel B: Mean NAV return of HXD, mean deviation due to compounding as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return, and mean deviation due to the management process (including fees, the manager's ability to meet the investment objective) as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return. Table 8 Mean Deviations from Target Return Based on NAVs S&P/TSX Global Gold, HGU (2x Bull), and HGD (2x Bear) July 1, 2007 -December 31, 2009 Panel A: Mean NAV return of HGU, mean deviation due to compounding as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return, and mean deviation due to the management process (including fees, the manager's ability to meet the investment objective) as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return. Panel B: Mean NAV return of HGD, mean deviations due to compounding as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return, and mean deviation due to the management process (including fees, the manager's ability to meet the investment objective) as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return. Table 9 Mean Deviations from Target Return Based on NAVs DJ/US Oil and Gas, DIG (2x Bull), and DUG (2x Bear) February 1, 2007 -December 31, 2009 Panel A: Mean NAV return of DIG, mean deviation due to compounding as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return, and mean deviation due to the management process (including fees, the manager's ability to meet the investment objective) as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return. Panel B: Mean NAV return of DUG, mean deviation due to compounding as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return, and mean deviation due to the management process (including fees, the manager's ability to meet the investment objective) as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return. Panel A: Mean NAV return of EFU, mean deviation due to compounding as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return, and mean deviation due to the management process (including fees, the manager's ability to meet the investment objective) as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return. Panel B: Mean NAV return of EEV, mean deviations due to compounding as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return, and mean deviation due to the management process (including fees, the manager's ability to meet the investment objective) as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return. Table 11 Mean Deviations from Target Return Based on NAVs S&P 500, SSO (2x Bull), and SDS (2x Bear) July 14, 2006 -December 31, 2009 Panel A: Mean NAV return of SSO, mean deviation due to compounding as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return, and mean deviation due to the management process (including fees, the manager's ability to meet the investment objective) as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return. Panel B: Mean NAV return of SDS, mean deviation due to compounding as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return, and mean deviation due to the management process (including fees, the manager's ability to meet the investment objective) as a percentage of (the absolute value of) mean return. Intraday 
